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WHAT IS REHNQUIST FEDERALISM?
MARcI A. HAMILTON t
In response to Erwin Chemnerinsky, Assessing ChiefJustice William
Rehnquist, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1331 (2006).
Professor Chemerinsky has provided a helpful and insightful tem-
plate for studying the major doctrinal areas addressed by the
Rehnquist Court.' He, Professor Tushnet,2 and Professor Merrill be-
fore them, quite appropriately, have begun the task of constructing
the larger narrative of how the Rehnquist Court addressed and some-
times altered major areas of the law. This sketching of the big picture
is very important.
There is another level that requires attention as well: I am going
to move from the inacro to the micro level. In this brief commentary,
I will confine my comments to one particular set of doctrines-those
implicating federalism-during the years Justice and then Chief Jus-
tice William Rehnquist served on the Court. My primary question is
what, if any, worldview stands behind Rehnquist federalism.
The federalism arena is worth close attention, as it is often
thought that the Rehnquist Court radically altered the law in this
arena. While it is true that Rehnquist was part of an alteration in the
state/federal balance during his tenure at the Court, it is harder to
sustain an argument that a radical shift took place, or that a unifying
vision can explain the federalism shift that did occur.
Cheierinsky summarizes the federalism cases as follows:
The Court's lack of deference to Congress was most evident in the
federalism decisions, where the Court invalidated laws as exceeding the
scope of the Comnerce Clause, narrowed the scope of Congress's power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, revived the Tenth
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Amendment as a constraint on federal power, and expanded the/scope
of sovereign immunity to limit the enforcement of federal statutes.
What Chemerinsky says is true, of course, but it captures just a slice of
federalism in the Rehnquist era, because there were significantly more
times that the Court declined to apply federalism than times it did
apply it. Far from overseeing a full-blown re-introduction of federal-
isin principles, Rehnquist led the Court down a much narrower path.
If one seeks to identify the worldview behind Rehnquist federal-
ism there are several possibilities. One can identify threads of differ-
ent views on federalism in dicta sprinkled through the federalism de-
cisions. Obvious possibilities, which I will discuss, are "Reaganite
Small Government," "Reining in Congress," and "States' Rights." Yet,
none of these approaches are used consistently through the
Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence. In the end, the Rehnquist adjust-
ment to the Court's federalism jurisprudence can best be captured by
the phrase, "Fair Play Federalism."
Reaganite Small Government. There might be an argument that
Rehnquist federalism was given a significant boost when President
Ronald Reagan, who served from 1981 to 1989, sailed into the White
House on the message that smaller government is better government.
Reagan not only viewed small government as a laudable goal, but he
also successfully nominated Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who would
share Rehnquist's belief in federalism as an important constitutional
principle.
The plain message was that big government was corrupt govern-
ment, and that there needed to be meaningful checks on Congress.
In comparison, the relatively smaller state governments appeared
more manageable and accountable. For westerners like Reagan,
Rehnquist, and O'Connor, it was not difficult to view Washington as a
distant and uninformed bureaucracy. They each brought that sensi-
bility with them to the federal government.
The small government thesis is consistent with the "enumerated
powers" theory of the Constitution, which limits Congress to the pow-
ers listed in Article I and in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Constitution further limits congressional power through the
Tenth Amendment. To be sure, a significant number of Rehnquist-
era cases use language that reflects these principles to some degree.'
4 Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 1339.
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (holding that a requirement
that state and local governments perform background checks before issuing firearm
permits is an unconstitutional infringement on state power); City of Boerne v. Flores,
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Ultimately, though, the small government principle was not evi-
dent in cases where it logically should have been. For example, while
the Court foumd in a limited number of cases that Congress exceeded
its Article I enumerated power under the Commerce Clause,I no
other enumerated power was treated to such a narrow construction
during the Rehnquist era. The most glaring example is the Spending
Clause.7
The power of the purse is always an important power, and, in Con-
gress's case, it is enormous. If the Rehnquist philosophy of federalism
was intended to achieve small government, one would have thought
that the Court not only would have placed limits on the exercise of
the Commerce Clause power, but also (and even more so) on the ex-
ercise of the spending power. Not a single case, however, has found
that Congress had exceeded its power under the Spending Clause-
despite Congress's increasingly creative ways to extend is power
through the purse. To the contrary, the Court's rhetoric opened the
door to increased spending power. During the Rehnquist era, the
Court upheld rather aggressive spending legislation with conditions
that burdened states and individual rights, including a new regulatory
interpretation of Title X of the Public Health Services Act, which for-
521 U.s. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
is not a proper exercise of Congress's Section 5 enforcement powers because the Act
"contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal
balance"); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (noting that the Constitu-
tion creates a federal government of enumerated powers to ensure the protection of
fundamental liberties); NewYork v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 153, 177 (1992) (hold-
ing that the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act's "take title" provision, requiring
states to exercise ownership of waste or regulate according to the instructions of Con-
gress, is "outside Congress' enumerated powers" and inconsistent with the Tenth
Amendment); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961) (explaining that "[t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution
to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the
State government are numerous and indefinite.").
Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001) (holding that the
Eleventh Amendment protects state governments fiom suit for alleged violations of
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62, 67 (2000) (holding that state governments could not be sued for violating the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 602 (2000) (holding unconstitutional the civil damages provisions of the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 for exceeding the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause
power); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that "the powers delegated
to Congress under Article I of the United States Constitution do not include the power
to subject nonconsenting States to private suits for damages in state courts."); Lopez,
514 U.S. at 561 (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 on the grounds
that such a regulation exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause powers because it "is a
criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of eco-
nonic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms").
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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bade doctors receiving federal funding from discussing abortion with
patients;8 the Solomon Amendment, which withdrew virtually all fed-
eral funding from any school that refused to permit military recruiters9
oi canpus; the federal statute that outlawed bribery of state and local
officials where the relevant government has taken at least $10,000 in
federal funds;10 the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments
Act of 1985, which ordered states to take title to waste; and the law
that conditioned a percentage of federal highway fluds oi states
choosing to raise the minimum drinking age.1"
It is hard, if not impossible, to argue that Rehnquist federalism
rests on a solid small government philosophy in light of the Rehnquist
Court's Spending Clause doctrine.
Reining in Congress. Reaganite Small Government may not pan out
as a theor to explain Rehnquist federalism, but perhaps the lesser no-
tion of Reining in Congress might.
The most articulate proponent for this worldview was Representa-
tive Newt Gingrich, who crafted the Contract with America in 1995,
which stated, in summary form:
FIRST, require all laws that apply to the rest of the country also apply
equally to the Congress;
SECOND, select a major, independent auditing fiim to conduct a com-
prehensive audit of Congress for waste, fraud or abuse;
THIRD, cut the number of House committees, and cut committee staff
by one-third;
FOURTH, limit the terms of all committee chairs;
A See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (upholding a 1988 interpretive
regulation limiting the scope of Title X funding to preventative family planning, in or-
der to require doctors receiving federal medical funding to refiain fiom discussing
abortion).
9 See Ruiisfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1305 (2006)
(holding that the federal government could constitutionally withdraw federal funds
from educational institutions that refused to provide equal "access to campuses" and
"access to students" to the military for interviewing students on campus).
10 See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004) (holding constitutional 18
U.S.C. § 666, which crininalizes bribeiy of an official of a state, local, or tibal govern-
ment entity that receives $10,000 or more in federal funds).
1 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (holding that the behav-
ior regulated only needs to "bear some relationship to the purpose of the federal
spending").
12 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (upholding a federal statute,
23 U.S.C. § 158, conditioning the disbursement of federal highway funds on recipient
states' decisions to raise tie Mininmun drinking age).
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FIFTH, ban the casting of proxy votes in committee;
SIXTH, require committee meetings to be open to the public;
SEVENTH, require a three-fifths majority vote to pass a tax increase;
EIGHTH, guarantee an honest accounting of oui Federal Budget by im-• . . 13
plemienting zero base-line 
budgeting.
Taken on its face, the Contract sought to find meaningful ways to
force Congress to be accounta)le to the people and for the larger
public good. It was also aimed at reducing perceived corruption in
Congress.
There is a similar sense in some of the federalism cases that Con-
gress had lost sight of all limitations. Perhaps the federalism revival
was really just intended as a wake-up call to Congress to increase its
awareness of the parameters of its constitutionally appointed role. On
this theory, the Court viewed Congress as a body that had become
drunk with its own power and blind to the limits placed on it by the
Constitution, in part because earlier Courts had
bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause
to a general police power of the sort retained by the States. Admittedly,
some of our prior cases have taken long steps down that road, giving
great deference to congressional action .... [W]e decline here to pro-
ceed any fuirther. "
The Court would only place "outer limits,1 on the exercise of that
power in limited circumstances, and would not take on the onerous
project of charting Congress's power altogether. On this theory, the
federalism cases were a shot over the bow, but not much more.
In Lopez, the Court chided Congress for failing to consider explic-
itly what power it was implementing with the Gun-Free School Zones
Act. "To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have
to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would.., convert
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general po-
lice power of the sort retained by the States."'" In Boerne, the Court
explained that its practice of deference to Congress rested on the as-
sumnption that Congress considered whether its enactments were con-
stitutional. There, the Court noted that Congress has a constitutional
duty to consider the constitutionality of its own actions:
3 See 140 CONG. REC. H9879-10, H9880 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1994) (statement of
Rep. Hoekstra) (outlining the principles of the Conti-act with America).
14 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
A) LI. at 557.
16 Id. at 567.
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When Congress acts within its sphere of power and responsibilities, it has
not just the right but the duty to make its own informed judgment on
the meaning and force of the Constitution .... James Madison ex-
plained that "it is incontrovertibly of as much importance to this branch
of the Government as to any other, that the constitution should be pre-
served entire. It is our duty." 1 Annals of Congress 500 (1789). Were it
otherwise, we would not afford Congress the presumption of validity its
enactments now enjoy.'7
These are not-so-subtle warnings to Congress to take heed of the
larger constitutional scheme and the limitations that scheme places
on it. They are only warnings, however, and they number few and far
between if one considers the large number of cases decided during
the Rehnquist era.
Even this weaker notion that the Rehnquist Court intended to
rein in Congress, or to give it fair warning of its limited powers,
though, is belied by the Rehnquist era's treatment of the nondelega-
tion doctrine. If the Court's vision was to rein in Congress-either
through warnings or the placement of actual limits on its power-one
would have thought that the Court would have embraced and revived
the nondelegation doctrine. The nondelegation doctrine stands for
the principle that Congress must make substantive law and may not
shift difficult public policy choices to administrative agencies. 8 Like
federalism until the late 1980s, since the 1930s it had become a doc-
trine with no force or content. While the Court has never overruled
the doctrine, it has been watered down to stand for the proposition
that Congress need give no more than an "intelligible principle" for
administrative agencies to follow to satisfy its obligation to make sub-
stantive law.'t9
When given the opportunity to rein in Congress's inclination to
pass off policy making to administrative agencies, the Rehnquist Court
showed no inclination to revive or invigorate the nondelegation doc-
trine to any degree.2" Nor did the Court issue any warnings about lim-
17 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997).
is See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (holding unconstitu-
tional the delegation of authority over the mining industiy at the local level); A.L.A.
Schechter Pouliy Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-30 (1935) (emphasizing
that delegation to administrative agencies "cannot be allowed to obscuire the limita-
tions of the authority to delegate"); see also DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RE-
SPONSIBILITY 155-64 (1995) (arguing normatively against the constitutionality of dele-
gation).
1 See'qitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
20 See id. at 474 (holding the scope of discretion conferred by the Clean Air Act to
be within the limits of the nondelegation doctrine).
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its on congressional power in this arena. The Reining in Congress
thesis, therefore, does not have much purchase beyond isolated state-
ments in a limited category of congressional power cases.
States' Rights. Perhaps Congress is the wrong focus, and it would
instead make more sense to focus on the Rehnquist era's direct treat-
ment of the states. (Even though the Constitution only accords indi-
viduals "rights," it has been popular to refer to federalism as "states'
rights."2 ' The more appropriate appellation is "state power." Here,
again, the Rehnquist Court did not follow this possible vision that
might have provided the theoretical basis for the federalism revival.
There were ample opportunities. For example, in Sabri, the Court
could have ruled that the federal government had no power to crimi-
nalize bribery of state and local officials, because criminal law gener-
ally belongs to the states, especially where the crime is directed at state
and local elected officials. The Court also could have held that the
federal government was intruding on matters inherently local, subject
to local and state law, and traditionally belonging to local govern-
ment. Many thought Sabri a golden opportunity to bring some meas-
uire of proportion to the spending power doctrine. Instead, the Court
opened the door to federal regulation at an inherently local level, rea-
soning that, since money is fungible, any local bribery would have af-
fected the recipient government.2 The fungibility argument is not
hard to follow, but it is a stretch to say that a mere $10,000, even in a
small community budget, justifies such federal intervention into an
arena traditionally left to state and local governments.
Tightening up the standards by which the federal government
may preempt state law is another avenue the Court could have fol-
lowed if it intended to strengthen state power. States would have
more latitude to operate without federal intervention were federal
preemption doctrine narrowed. As others have pointed out, the next
logical step following the Commerce Clause, Section 5, and Tenth
Amendment cases was to place limits on the extent to which Congress
could preempt state law. This simply did not happen.3
21 See, e.g., DavidJ. Barron, Fighting Federalism with Federlism: / it's Not just a Battle
Between tederalists and Nationalists, What is it?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2081 (2006); William
M. Carter, Jr., A Thireenh, Amendment Framework Jor Combating Racial Pqfilirg, 39 IIARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17 (2004); Ronald D. Rotunda, The New Stales' Rigts, the New Fedeial-
ism, the New Commerce CIause, and the Proposed New Abdication, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. Rnv.
869 (2000).
22 Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 606 (2004).
2, See Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246 (2004)
(holding that a Local Fleet rule attempting to regulate the purchase or lease of vehi-
cles was preempted by the federal Clean Air Act because treating the purchase of vehi-
cles differently fro their manufacture made no sense); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
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Fair Play Federalism. Rehnquist federalism, in the end, appears to
be a much less ambitious project than any of the preceding theories
would support. Instead of the more difficult project of rearranging
the boundaries of power between Congress and the states, perhaps it
is more accurate to describe the new doctrine as one of "fair play." If
one looks at the laws invalidated and the theories set forth, it starts to
appear that the value being vindicated is not so much federalism as a
category, but rather fair play between Congress and the states.
Take a look at the laws that were invalidated. Lopez invalidated the
Gun-Free School Zones Act. The Court noted that criminal law and
24schools are areas of traditional control for the states, so this was a
synergistic takeover of state lawmaking prerogatives. And, with all due
respect to its drafters, it seemed like a particularly unnecessary piece
of legislation, as local law enforcement would remove those with guns
near schools anyway. In Printz, the Court invalidated the Brady Act,
which required states to provide manpower and money to do back-
ground checks for gun owners. While the policy of tracking gun own-
ers itself did not make the law constitutionally suspect, the heavy-
handed fashion in which the federal government tossed off a policy• 25
objective and then told the states to carry it out crossed the line.
The Court invalidated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, in part,
because the Act imposed its requirements (which were intended to
undermine many neutral, generally applicable laws for the benefit of
religious entities) on every single law in a state. Its scope and breadth
and consequent enormous burden on the states alone made it suspi-
cious and unfair. 2
The Court invalidated the civil remedy provisions of the Violence
21Against Women Act, because they were beyond Congress' power.
From the Court's viewpoint, it appears that Congress leapfrogged over
a legitimate exercise of its powers in that arena-it could have en-
forced the civil rights of victims against local police who ignored rape
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2002) (finding a Massachusetts law regulating the advertisement
of cigarettes within one-thousand feet of schools or playgrounds to be preempted by
the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA)); United States v. Locke,
529 U.S. 89 (2000) (holding Washington statutes regulating oil-tanker design and op-
erating requirements to be preempted by the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972
and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990); Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88
(1992) (holding that an Illinois statute regulating licensing provisions for handlers of
hazardous waste was preempted by OSHA).
24 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3, 567 (1995).
2) Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933-34 (1997),.
26 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518-20 (1997).
27 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000).
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cases. Instead, Congress chose to ignore this root problem, which
appropriately could have justified federal attention, and decided in-
stead to regulate the relationship between the perpetrator and the vic-
tim by creating, for all intents and purposes, a new tort remedy-where
individual torts are traditionally the domain of the states. The Court
invalidated Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act in the Garrett
case where the record was replete with evidence of discrimination
against the disabled in the private sector, but lacked meaningful proof
that the states had engaged in the same behavior.29 As Justice Ken-
nedy noted, it hardly seemed fair to subject the states to the ADA's
burdens when the record suggested that the vast majority of the states
were enacting civil rights laws for the disabled, not violating them.
The fair play rationale works in the other direction as well. W"hen
the state was acting as a participant in the market for information, the
Court had no problem with Congress regulating the state like all other
market participants under the Drivers Privacy Protection Act. 31 More-
over, when fundamental rights were at stake, the Court was much
more likely to give Congress latitude to regulate the states than if the
right at issue was significantly less valuable. For example, in Tennessee
v. Lane, the Court vindicated the application of Title II of the ADA
against the states where the right at issue was the fundamental right of
access to the courts. 32 In another case, the Court had little patience
for the states' attempts to provide for medical marijuana when the
federal government had already built an enormous drug-fighting edi-
fice.! Finally, the Court has repeatedly stated that the Voting Rights
Act, which rests on the long, ignominious history of racism in the
United States, is no violation of federalism principles.1 If there ever
L8 d. at 626.
29 Bd. of Trs. of Univ. ofAla. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001).
?10 See id. at 375-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that "[Jif the states had
been transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment by their mistreatment or lack of con-
cern for those with impairments, on would have expected to find ... extensive litiga-
tion. This confirmingjudicial docmnentation does not exist.").
M See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000) (holding that the Driver's Pri-
mary Protection Act may regulate states because it is generally applicable to the market
of information suppliers).
?Q See Tennessee. v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004) (holding that "Title II, as it
applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts,
constitutes a valid exercise of Congress' § 5 authority to enforce the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment").
?"?, See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2203-04 (2005) (describing the declara-
tion of the "war on drugs" and the subsequent enactment of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970).
M See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999) (recognizing that the
Voting Rights Act intrudes into "sensitive areas of state and local policymaking," but
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was ajudgment based on an intuitive sense of fairness, that is it.
W"hat can be said for certain is that the federalism jurisprudence
from the Rehnquist era is not a strong version. Nor is it an ideological
version. It is more intuitive and a creature of common sense, seem-
ingly motivated by a desire to warn Congress from overplaying its
power against the states. The Rehnquist Court should not go down in
history as making radical changes to protect or enlarge state power or
to limit congressional power. Congressional power remains enor-
mous, and rarely checked byjudicial doctrine.
The most interesting question now is whether the Roberts Court
will move from this Fair Play Federalism jurisprudence toward one of
the stronger theories discussed above, continue with the Rehnquist
Court's Fair Play Federalism, or simply retrench on federalism alto-
gether. At this point in history, all three options are live possibilities.
noting "that the Reconstruction Amendments by their nature contemplate some intru-
sion into areas traditionally reserxed to the States."); see also City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997) (classifying the Voting Rights Act as "legislation which deters
or remedies constitutional violations" and thus falls within Congress's enforcement
power).
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